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This paper describes a NRC-sponsored research project formed to help
confirm the technical basis for the proposed Pressurized Thermal Shock
(PTS) rule, to aid in the development of guidance for licensee plant-
specific PTS analyses, and to examine the effects of proposed corrective
measures. The research project, still under way (10/84), consists of
PTS pilot analyses for three PWRs: Oconee Unit 1, designed by Babcock
and Wilcox; Calvert Cliffs Unit 1, designed by Combustion Engineering;
and H. B. Robinson Unit 2, designed by Westinghouse. The study team
consists of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Idaho National Engi-
neering Laboratory (INEL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Brook-
haven National Laboratory (BNL), and Purdue University, with the results
being integrated by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).
The overall objectives of the PTS studies at ORNL are: (1) to provide
for each of the three plants an estimate of the frequency of a PTS-
induced through-the-wall crack (TWC); (2) to determine the dominant
overcooling sequences, plant features, and operator and control actions,
as well as the important uncertainties, in the PTS risk; and (3) to
evaluate the effectiveness of potential corrective measures for reducing
the TWC frequencies. ORNL is also to determine what parts of the studies
might have generic applicability.
Thousands of hypothetical overcooling sequences were constructed for
each plant analysis using computer-generated event trees based on quanti-
fied event initiating frequencies and branch probabilities. A screening
frequency of 1.0E-7 per reactor year was used to screen out those sequen-
ces (scenarios) which had a very low probability of occurring. All
remaining scenarios were considered explicitly, and those scenarios
screened out were grouped into "residual" groups to ensure that their
contributions to the TWC frequency were included in the study.
Full-scale thermal-hydraulics analyses were performed for a selected
number of the scenarios. For Calvert Cliffs the analyses were performed
by LANL using the TRAC computer code, and for H. B. Robinson they were
performed by INEL using the RELAP5 code. For Oconee both LANL and INEL
used their respective analysis tools to analyze selected Oconee tran-
sients. The remaining scenarios were analyzed with simpler models by
Science Applications, Inc. (Oconee and Calvert Cliffs) and INEL (H. B.
Robinson). In addition, mixing calculations were performed by Purdue
University for some of the scenarios.
Probabilistic fracture-mechanics calculations were performed by ORNL for
all the scenarios for which thermal-hydraulic analyses were performed.
The results of these analyses, performed with the computer code OCA-P,
were then integrated by ORNL to predict the TWC frequency for each
plant. The best estimate values determined for each plant are as
follows:
TWC frequency TWC frequency at
at 32 EFPY* RTNDT+2o = 270°F**
Oconee Unit 1 5E-6/yr 5E-6/yr
Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 lE-7/yr 2E-7/yr
H. B. Robinson Unit 2 <lE-ll/yr lE-8/yr
*EFPY = effective full power years.
**RTNDT = nil-ductility reference temperature.
It should be noted that the Oconee analysis was the first plant study
performed, and the analysts felt that certain assumptions may have led
to an overpredirtion of the actual PTS risk for this plant.
An uncertainty analysis performed for each plant indicated that a factor
of about 100 is an appropriate 95% confidence interval, assuming a log-
normal uncertainty distribution. The uncertainty in the flaw density in
the pressure vessel was found to be the most important contributor to
the overall uncertainty in the risk.
For Oconee the dominant risk sequences were basically secondary side
initiating events. The vent valves tended to mitigate cooldowns domi-
nated by high-pressure injection (HPI) flow under low loop-flow condi-
tions. This virtually eliminated the importance of loss-of-coolant
accidents (LOCAs) as PTS transients. The presence of an integrated
control system tended to increase the probability of PTS-type events,
and the full pressure head system provided a means by which repres-
surization could be performed rapidly relative to the other two plants.
The most important operator action was determined to be the isolation of
the steam generator during an excess steam flow event (either a steam-
line pipe break or a steam-line valve failure). This action was especi-
ally important since Oconee does not have main steam isolation valves
(MSIVs). Reduction of the vessel fluence appeared to be the most bene-
ficial risk reduction action for this plant. Fluence rate reduction
factors of 2, 4, and 8 reduced the estimated TWC frequencies by factors
of approximately 5, 20, and 50, respectively, at 32 EFPY.
For the Calvert Cliffs plant, which does not have vent valves, the LOCA
events were much more important than for the Oconee plant. In fact, the
top three dominant risk sequences for Calvert Cliffs involved a small-
break LOCA in which total loop flow stagnation was predicted. (It
should be noted that each of these sequences occurred at low decay heat
condition, and loop flow stagnation was not predicted for small-break
LOCA events occurring at full power. In fact, none of the sequences
occurring from full power were considered major contributors to the
overall PTS risk.) The relative importance of each initiator class for
Calvert Cliffs can be seen in Figure 1, in which the TWC frequency is
plotted as a function of RTNDT, fluence, and EFPY for each initiator
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Figure 1. Risk associated with each category of events.
1. Large main steam-line break at low decay heat.
2. Small main steam-line break at low decay heat.
3. Large main steam-line break at full power.
4. Small main steam-line break at full power.
5. Small-break LOCA (<0.l6 sq. ft.) at full power.
6. Small-break LOCA (<0.05 sq. ft.) at low decay heat.
7. Small-break LOCA (>0.016 and <0.05 sq. ft.) at full power.
8. Steam generator overfeed.
The HPI shutoff head design for Calvert Cliffs (1275 psi) had a major
impact by slowing the repressurization process and thus reducing the PTS
risk. Operator actions associated with the overcooling initiating
events considered in this analysis appear to be less important with
respect to PTS than in the analysis for the other two plants. This is
due to the automatic function design of the MSIVs and auxiliary feed-
water block valves. Heating of the HPI water was found to have a major
impact on the risk values since the dominant risk sequences involved
cooldowns associated with HPI water. Increasing the HPI water by about
30°F was found to decrease the TWC frequency by nearly a factor of 10.
In addition, as in the Oconee analysis, fluence reductions were found to
be a reasonable means for decreasing the potential for a through-the-
wall crack.
Since the H. B. Robinson conclusions are still being developed, they are
not presented in this paper. However, there are some general findings
which can be addressed. First of all, the very low RTNDT value at 32
EFPY (<200°F) resulted in very low conditional failure probabilities,
making the fracture mechanics calculations difficult. As a result,
conservative extrapolations were used to bound the estimated TWC fre-
quency at 32 EFPY, and most of the calculations were performed for a
hypothetical H. B. Robinson plant which had a RTNDT value of 27°°F.
Secondary side initiating events were found to be the dominant sequences
for this plant condition. The LOCA events did not result in stagnant
flow for break sizer less than 2 in., and thus the cooldown was not
severe. For LOCAs 2 in. in size or slightly larger, stagnation did
occur very early and downcomer temperatures of approximately 100°F were
obtained within 45 min. However, although many cracks were initiated,
the pressure drop associated with the transient was rapid. Thus, there
was no driving force on the crack and nearly all initiated cracks arrested.
The H, B. Robinson analysis will be completed and a separate report will
be issued in the coming year for each plant studied. In addition, a
comparison of the three studies will be made to provide a better under-
standing of the PTS issue.
